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DISCUSSION: UNIT
DETERMINATION
Moderator:
CALVIN WILLIAM SHA.RPE
Associate Professor of Law
Case Western Reserve School of Law
Panelists:
ANDRIA S. KNAPP
Assistant Professor of Law
University of Pittsburgh Law School
JAMES T. O'REILLY
PROFESSOR CALVIN WILLIAM SHARPE: Thank you, Mr.
O'Reilly. Shall we open it up now for questions from the floor?
Please address your questions either to Professor Knapp or Mr.
O'Reilly on Unit Determination.
PROFESSOR ROGER ABRAMS: Mr. O'Reilly, it was fashionable
for a while for academics to criticize the National Labor Relations
Board for not using its rulemaking power. And as I understand it,
the National Labor Relations Board never used that power for
political reasons. They were concerned about dealing with the two
major conflicting interest groups: management and organized la-
bor. The Board's concern was that by acting like a planning
agency, it might undermine its legitimacy and its funding. Don't
you see the same risk for SERB if it's going to start planning public
sector labor relations-it might plan itself out of business?
MR. JAMES T. O'REILLY: Where does one get legitimacy?
When there is a new statute, legitimacy comes from the ability of
one group to exercise its political franchise through the legislature;
and structure a bill in this fashion. Many of the management peo-
ple whom I have interviewed said with a bit of humor, "I'm glad
that the Board has found such difficulty because I told them so." I
don't see the management side questioning the legitimacy of the
Board's role. Consequently, rulemaking will not reduce the legiti-
macy of what the Board is doing. Union representatives whom I've
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interviewed have expressed frustration with the Board's delays in
unit determinations, waiting for the right cases to come along. As a
result of the Board's policy, the unions are finding more and more
recalcitrant employers saying: "I won't act as an employer until
I'm ordered to do so by the Board, because I don't see a precedent."
I think we can address that union frustration through rulemaking.
PROFESSOR ABRAMS: Don't you think that management would
be very concerned if SERB were efficient!
MR. O'REILLY: That could certainly be a possibility. The pur-
poses of the Act are not necessarily employer-oriented. They are
structure and systematic-improvement-oriented.
PROFESSOR ABRAMS: Another reason for an agency's not using
rulemaking, is that it has insufficient knowledge about an issue to
set standards. Consequently, the agency then takes a slower case-
by-case approach as a learning process. Isn't there more learning to
go on here before SERB starts planning?
MR. O'REILLY: Yes, students, professors and the like are con-
tinually learning; and in a particular situation, the Board may
choose to wait to adopt a rule. I think the Board needs to establish
substantive guidance more rapidly than it has. However, that sub-
stantive guidance is not going to come out of the adjudication pipe-
line at the speed necessary to serve the interests of its constituents.
PROFESSOR SHARPE: I see a more basic challenge here, and that
comes in the statement that Professor Knapp made during her pres-
entation: whether rulemaking has the potential for dealing with
some of the basic concerns created by the unit determination
provisions.
PROFESSOR ANDRIA S. KNAPP: What I hear Jim [O'Reilly]
saying is that delay is a major problem. Rulemaking ordinarily ad-
dresses substantive issues. If SERB, through administrative meas-
ures, can eliminate its delay, and those delays which the parties
engage in for their own purposes, then rulemaking is unnecessary.
The question is, whether administratively SERB can do that.
MR. O'REILLY: It certainly would be an accomplishment if
they could do it.
PROFESSOR KNAPP: I don't really know enough about the
Board's resource problems, or what they've learned during the past
year to know whether in fact they say, "Okay, if you give us a unit
determination problem we can turn it around in 'X' number of
days." If they can do that, then they don't need to provide broad
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general rules through rulemaking, because the parties are not as in-
terested in the general rule as they are in their own particular case.
PROFESSOR SHARPE: How does rulemaking help to solve the
problem of unit proliferation? For example, how is rulemaking go-
ing to help us to deal with some of the problems that Professor
Knapp brought out in her discussion on unit determination? Is
rulemaking going to help deal with the problem of fragmentation,
particularly in the sheriff's office; where you have the sergeant and
the lieutenant in one unit, and the rank and file in another? How
does rulemaking get at those kinds of concerns?
MR. O'REILLY: Rulemaking offers you the opportunity to
make a statement of policy which the employer will understand to
be the Board's binding statement on how it will interpret the partic-
ular subject. For instance, if the Board created a rule concerning
the fragmentation issue, the employer then would have no real in-
terest in waiting around for the adjudication precedent. Therefore,
the employer is more likely to resolve the matter voluntarily
through some action of its own, rather than to wait for the Board to
establish a precedent.
PROFESSOR SHARPE: But isn't it true that the legislature would
have to amend the statute to solve that particular [proliferation]
problem?
MR. O'REILLY: For the police sergeants, you definitely need an
amendment to the statute. You are unlikely to get an amendment
to the statute on some of these interstitial questions. Therefore, I
would argue the Board should use rulemaking; put them before the
legislature, and if the legislature does not act, use that rule.
PROFESSOR KNAPP: Why do you need an amendment to the
statute? Doesn't the statute provide for multi-unit bargaining? I'd
like to hear from both Judge Day and Mr. Anderson on this point,
because of their extensive experience.
JUDGE DAY: First of all, we're not likely to get an amendment
to the statute at all-not even on mail balloting. The suggestion is
that rulemaking is a panacea, from the standpoint of anticipating
problems and solving them in advance. However, the reality is that
this Act does not have to be amended at all by the legislature. If we
were to attempt to amend it by rule, we would have to get by the
Joint Committee on Agency Rule Review that is made up of legisla-
torsl They would go over the proposed rule after our own intricate
process. As most people in Columbus who are sophisticated about
these matters will tell you, if JCARR doesn't want the rule, you're
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not going to get it. To show you how unbendingly rigid JCARR
can be, there is an obvious error in our statute in section 4117.12
which says, "If a frivolous complaint is filed, it may be dismissed by
the Board and costs assessed." Well, if we've issued a complaint,
are we going to find ourselves frivolous? If we do, against whom
shall we assess the cost? Ourselves? When we presented that to
JCARR for amendment, we weren't allowed to amend it because
that would contradict the statute. I cite that not to ridicule JCARR
but simply to show how difficult the problem is. The idea that we
can put these provisions in the statute-some of us might think that
it would be a more felicitous condition by rulemaking-is not realis-
tic. It simply cannot be done.
MR. ARVID ANDERSON: I would like to suggest that the policy
determination, such as in your "state-wide unit" case may be the
ideal size shoe for the State of Ohio. It might even fit the larger
cities, but not necessarily have any application to a number of the
smaller communities, so that the level of rulemaking may benefit
from experience as to what makes sense.
PROFESSOR SHARPE: You have a question from the floor.
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: The problem we have is what level
of generality do you put the rules on? Your examples were fine; you
can always take cases that are clearly wrong-that we think are
clearly wrong-from the single person unit. The trouble is if you do
it at a very specific level, then you have the rulemaking procedures
that may be as time consuming as the cases you indicated. If you
do it on a very general level like the UCC's unconscionability provi-
sion, you're going to have, just as they have in civil law, case-by-
case determination as to what the general terms mean. Just how
general can we make it and have it be effective?
MR. O'REILLY: That's the "Sixty-Four Dollar Question." It is
difficult to say to what degree you can shape the individual units.
Mr. Anderson is exactly right; how do you deal with a small welfare
department, a small police department? I would say if you adopt
rules of presumption that are rebuttable, you might give enough
guidance to the parties to act on the basis of that generality, and
then tailor it to specific cases.
MR. ANDERSON: Legislatures have done this before. In Wis-
consin, they legislated certain units. In Hawaii they legislated cer-
tain units, which is a form of rulemaking, but it is with the
authority to make the rules. They didn't go ahead in either of those
jurisdictions and try legislated units with the state employees, other
than to make certain demarcations for managerial and/or confiden-
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tial employees. They did not attempt to go further than that and
decide appropriate bargaining units.
MR. MOYED: One of the concerns I have with the rulemaking
thing is that I'm afraid that the rules that are adopted might just be
another quandary, and may not give any more clear guidance than
at present. I fail to see in that case how that could cut down the
cost of administration and adjudication.
MR. O'RELLY: I was thinking of that when one of the manage-
ment people said, "What the union proposed seemed fine to me, but
there was no precedent, so I couldn't in good conscience accept it. I
had to file objections, and we'll see where it comes out from here."
MR. ANDERSON: I'd like to offer one other comment. There is
great concern about time in the determination of units, and I can
appreciate that, but I can say to you that your experience follows
that of most other jurisdictions. This problem will be in the fore-
front for the next two to three years, maybe a little longer, but that's
going to be the peak. It will then start to dissipate. It is a very
important question and, therefore, if there is delay thats not all bad,
because there may be some intelligent consideration of the problems
involved. If somebody has to be given "patience lessons," that is
the price to be paid for it. We've waited decades for a collective
bargaining law; give the administrators a chance to do it right.
JUDGE DAY: Hear, Hear!
OPEN FORUM
PROFESSOR SHARPE: We have about ten minutes left, why
don't you feel free at this point to raise any questions that you may
have at all-that applies to our panelists and audience alike-per-
haps we can get some final discussion into the record.
AUDIENCE PARTIciPANT: I would like to ask Judge Day one
question. I'm not sure if he has these statistics, but when the Act
was first passed there was great trepidation, particularly on the part
of the municipal employers. And I'm wondering whether or not in
the past year you have found that ultimately those concerns were
ironed out, or if there is still a great deal of the kind of antagonism
that emanated from the Ohio Municipal League?
JUDGE DAY: It would be hard to say whether there is a great
deal, there certainly is some. We have a few so-called trouble spots,
but there has been quite a bit of militance about what the munici-
palities are going to do or ought to do. It is they, of course, who are
raising the issue about unconstitutionality of the Act, because they
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say collective bargaining is a matter of local self-government.
Therefore, it is constitutionally reserved for them, and cannot be
delegated to us. So far they have struck out every time that they
have gone to bat in a court. The ultimate resolution to that issue
remains to be seen. I don't see, and maybe it's because I have an
"alligator's hide" that I am not conscious of any great municipal
outcry. If the troops are sullen, they are not rebellious.
AUDIENCE PARTICiPANT: Have you seen any heavy financial
burdens falling upon any communities?
JUDGE DAY: No, I haven't seen anything horrendous. There
are so many factors that enter into the fiscal problem: the elasticity,
the tax base, a whole raft of factors. So far, we have not encoun-
tered them; part of the problem is that we are new. A great many
things have come to fruition. One of the reasons that we adopted
the case-by-case approach is because just such an issue might in-
volve ripples and reverberations which we cannot anticipate. I
would have a great deal of trouble setting down fiscal factors which
a conciliator must consider before he could order a cost item or
order it retroactively. Of course, he cannot order retroactively un-
less the order for conciliation came in during the fiscal year. The
short answer to your question is that I have not been aware of any
unrest.
PROFESSOR ABRAMs: The one distinctive characteristic of the
Ohio statute is that collective bargaining has gone on in this state
for decades. In Cincinnati, they've been bargaining since about the
early 50's or before, and in Cleveland, collective bargaining is old
news. It may be new in certain places downstate but not in others.
What I was interested in, is what kind of impact the statute has
had on established relationships? They're bargaining like they used
to bargain, aren't they?
MR. O'REILLY: In my paper, I called this the Tale of Two Cit-
ies. Columbus and Cleveland are good examples. Cleveland has
twenty-six unions which its municipal labor office deals with; it's a
well-oiled machine up here. Cleveland has had relatively harmoni-
ous experience since the Act went into effect.
Columbus has had significant turmoil in the police division, and
they have had approximately five years of bargaining. Columbus is
having more problems with the "start-up" and dealing with it. In
fact, its representatives are spared the benefit of not having to travel
to Columbus, and that is the only thing about which they did not
complain.
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PROFESSOR ABRAMS: What about other cities in the state, have
you seen a similar pattern or no problems?
MR. O'REILLY: Athens is very concerned. Cincinnati has said
the Act is troublesome because in the past we have developed proce-
dures, but now we're not sure of our methods any more.
JUDGE DAY: Now, I know about the Athens case. There is a
complex explanation for what happened there. Part of it is Athens'
own fault: a lack of understanding of what the Act is all about. I
don't say that to condemn Athens-there are a lot of us who don't
know what the Act is about or are reasonably lacking in hubris on
that subject. But the fact is that Athens' misunderstanding contrib-
uted largely to it.
They had a VR [voluntary recognition request] in a unit that
was impermissible under the statute, and thought that because they
could agree, they could go forward. That was simply not so. How-
ever, one swallow does not make a summer.
AUDiENCE PARTICiPANT: Yes, but they are the squeaky wheel
of the delay-
JUDGE DAY: Squeaky wheels always squeak-the oiled ones do
not. The vast majority of wheels are not squeaking-at least not as
much as they were.
AUDIENCE PARuCnANT: You mentioned the voluntary recog-
nition process, and I want to question that on its face. The Ohio
statute seems to imply some more limitations on what employers
and unions can do as far as walking in, and being recognized with-
out the employees having a vote. However, some of the decisions
have turned that around and appear to make a volunteer recogni-
tion petition in an appropriate unit something that is very difficult
for an employer to refuse recognition on. I wonder if you can make
a comment on the rationale behind that.
JUDGE DAY: First, one word about the process, because it is
somewhat intricate. If a union wants voluntary recognition under
section 4117.05 of the statute, it files a request for recognition with a
substantial showing of interest. The substantial showing must indi-
cate that they have fifty plus percent of the people. The employer
has a number of recourses. One of them is to file a RC [recognition]
petition, and under the statute as it stands, that takes us to section
4117.07. Under its provisions, there must be an investigation to see
whether there is a prima facie case on the representation issue. If
there is a prima facie case, then we have a hearing in which the sole
issue is whether there is in fact a representation issue. If it turns out
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in the hearing that there is not a representation issue, then we cer-
tify the unit. If there is a representation issue, we order an election.
Now on the question of investigation, we have managed to com-
press that time period a little by ruling that anytime an RC is filed
in response to a VR, then that makes the prima facie case, and we
proceed to a hearing. However, I think it would make sense if we
said any time that the request for voluntary recognition was made
and any objections were made then we would go to election
forthwith.
The reason I say that is because an election determines a lot of
things immediately. Furthermore, the union claims it has the ma-
jority, and it is hardly in a position to object to a canvass which will
determine if a majority exists. If the management really thinks that
there is no majority, then it can hardly object to a canvass which
will determine that.
I would restrict the VR in a very severe way so that we could get
to certain cases quicker than we have. But we have done hundreds
of those since last June.
MR. STARR: The system that you just described would seem to
be acceptable to most everyone, and at the same time be pretty
much the way the people who have had to work under it have inter-
preted it. However, from the reading of certain decisions, it seems
as though that has not been the case. Rather than interpreting this
question of representation as meaning "is there sufficient support to
justify an election," the Board has interpreted the question as
whether there "is more than thirty percent but less than fifty
percent?"
JUDGE DAY: That's not the VR. It is fifty plus percent.
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: I understand that the VR enabled
you to have an RC hearing.
JUDGE DAY: Well, it gets to the RC hearing in the sense that it
refers to the statute that governs RC hearings, but the initial show-
ing, substantial interest, has to be fifty percent. The employer has
the obligation, and it is a serious difficulty for the employers to
prove in the representation hearing that there is in fact a representa-
tion issue-that there is not fifty percent.
The employer is at the same time foreclosed from seeing the
union showing of interest on the time honored proposition that a
union does not have to expose employees who signed the cards or
signed the petition. On the other hand, the employer has the bur-
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den of proof, since it is his RC and the burden of proof must be at
least by a preponderance of the evidence.
One of the issues we face now from employers is how do we do
that? Well, the answer is the statute as it stands seems to leave us
no alternative. If the statute were to say what many people thought
it said, but upon close reading did not, that as soon as you fie an
RC in response to a VR, then you get an election, there would be no
problem. You would get the election, and you would get it over
with.
I, frankly, do not have a great deal of patience with the idea that
"we made a claim, and we can't really substantiate it, so we need
time to do what we said we had done in the first place," or "we do
not like what is happening, and therefore we want to impose it, and
put impediments in the way of an ultimate determination." In a
word, parties can indulge employees; I do not think the Board can,
and the Board does not intend to allow playing fast and loose with
the rules. The statute is complex. It is written in English, that was
about the last effort at clarity.
AUDIENCE PARTncnAN: The difficulty I have is with the ra-
tionale for not proceeding with the employer's petition. If the em-
ployer comes in and cannot provide numbers, SERB will hold that
there is no question of representation shown by the employer.
However, it seems at the same time you are about to certify a union
that is not yet recognized. There must, thereby, be some kind of
question for SERB to act upon.
JUDGE DAY: The employer has twenty-one days. He can post a
notice indicating his intentions. If he does not act in twenty-one
days or someone else has not raised the point in twenty-one days,
then the certification is automatic. If he fails to post, then the inac-
tion on his part will result in a certification. But, our misunder-
standing, and I must say frankly it applies to most of us at the
Board, was cleared up when a lawyer raised a point of the necessity
for going through the details of the section 4117.07 procedure, and
we found out that we simply have been reading the thing more opti-
mistically than the facts would warrant.
Now, it would seem to me logical to say anytime that there is a
question, one of the defenses is that a competing union has fied
showing that they have ten percent of the people for which a volun-
tary recognition request is made. An easy way to resolve all such
questions is by election. I cannot understand the resistance to that.
MR. ANDERSON: I would like to endorse that, as one with expe-
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rience, having received an affidavit form containing the two-week
period payroll signatures of the employees with the majority for
"A" union, the majority for "B" union and the majority for no
union. I somehow believe in the validity of the secret ballot.
PROFESSOR SHARPE: On that note, I think we should try to
wrap this up.
I think that this has been a very constructive exchange of views
on the problems arising in the first year of the statute and possible
solutions. The ideas that have been aired here may very well influ-
ence statutory changes and changes in the administration of the
statute. I am certain that will contribute to the growing body of
public sector collective bargaining knowledge, and that, perhaps,
will influence other states.
I would just at this point like to conclude with a final thank you
to our panelists who have done a superb job and to you, the mem-
bers of the audience, for participating. Thank you very much!
CASE NOTE
Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman:
Federalism and the State Law Claim
In Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman (Pennhurst II), the
Supreme Court extended eleventh amendment protection to state officers when claims
against them are based on pendent state law grounds As a result the federal court
was deprived ofproperly obtained subject matterjurisdiction. The Court, in its deci-
sio, misinterprets the logic of Ex parte Young and misconstrues principles offeder-
alism. This Note argues that federalism would best be protected by allowing federal
courts to hear claims against state officers based on state law violations. Under this
suggested approach, the federal courts could recognize state policies rather than inter-
pret federal statutes or make constitutional determinations. Finally, this Note high-
lights the majority's language in Pennhurst II and concludes that the case stands for
the limited proposition that the Young exception does not apply to cases granting
relief based on state law.
INTRODUCTION
THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT to the United States Consti-
tution' prohibits federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over
suits against states that do not consent to being sued in federal
court.2 It is this amendment which effectively requires federal
courts to recognize state claims of sovereign immunity. One excep-
tion to the protection sovereign immunity provides is set forth in Ex
parte Young,3 which involved a suit against a state officer who was
acting pursuant to an unconstitutional state statute. Although the
state officer was enforcing state law, the Supreme Court held that
because the state had no power to promulgate an unconstitutional
law, the suit was not a suit against the state, but merely a suit
against the officer in his individual capacity.' The sovereign immu-
nity defense was therefore not available to the officer.
Generally, a federal court with subject matter jurisdiction can
decide pendent state law claims, as well as all federal claims, if the
state claims arise as part of the same case.5 Pennhurst State School
1. U.S. CoNSr. amend. XI. See infra text accompanying note 19 for text of
amendment.
2. See infra note 20 for discussion of waiving eleventh amendment immunity.
3. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). See infra notes 28-45 and accompanying text for further dis-
cussion of this case.
4. See infra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 137-46 and accompanying text for general discussion of pendent jur-
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& Hospital v. Haldennan6 (Pennhurst I1) presented the United
States Supreme Court with an Ex parte Young fact pattern in the
context of a pendent state law violation.7 In resolving the issues
presented by Pennhurst II, the Court had the opportunity to explore
how the federalism concerns which underlie the eleventh amend-
ment might best be protected.' Rather than basing its decision on
proper analysis of federalism issues, however, the Court extended
eleventh amendment sovereign immunity protection beyond its pre-
vious scope9 in the name of protecting federalism principles, 10 while
simultaneously misinterpreting those principles.'1
After providing eleventh amendment background,' 2 this Note
explains the facts, the procedural history, and the Supreme Court's
opinion in Pennhurst IIJ. 3 It then examines the eleventh amend-
ment issues presented by Pennhurst 11 and critiques the Court's
analysis of those issues.14 Contrary to the majority's analysis in
Pennhurst II, the federalism values underlying the eleventh amend-
ment doctrine of state sovereign immunity are best protected by
permitting federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over state law
claims against state officers. 5 Moreover, the pendent jurisdiction
doctrine supports this conclusion. 6 Finally, this Note identifies
language in the Court's opinion that is both unnecessary to its hold-
ing and potentially harmful to eleventh amendment principles, and
thus should be regarded as dicta. 7
I. THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND Ex PARTE YOUNG
The eleventh amendment to the United States Constitution was
isdiction. It should be noted that the eleventh amendment deprives federal courts of subject
matter jurisdiction while the Ex parte Young doctrine provides federal courts with subject
matter jurisdiction. See infra notes 111-25 and accompanying text for discussion of previous
eleventh amendment cases where the Supreme Court properly decided the case on pendent
state law grounds.
6. 104 S. Ct. 900 (1984).
7. See infira notes 46-86 and accompanying text for discussion of facts and issues
presented by the Pennhurst cases.
8. See infira notes 149-53 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 108-31 and accompanying text.
10. See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
11. See infira notes 147-53 and accompanying text for discussion of how federalism val-
ues can best be protected in a Pennhurst II-type case.
12. See infra notes 18-45 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 46-105 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 106-31 and accompanying text.
15. See infira notes 131, 149-53 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 147-53 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 154200 and accompanying text.
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adopted in 179818 and reads: "The Judicial power of the United
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citi-
zens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State."' 19 The amendment functions as a restriction on federal court
jurisdiction by prohibiting suit against a state in federal court with-
out its consent,20 even when its own citizens bring the suit.21 The
eleventh amendment incorporates the common law doctrine of sov-
ereign immunity and rests on structural principles of federalism,22 a
doctrine that insulates certain basic aspects of state authority from
federal interference.23
It is firmly established that a claim is a "claim" against the state,
and therefore barred by the eleventh amendment, if the state is ac-
tually named as a defendant24 or if "the state is a real, substantial
18. Apparently, the eleventh amendment was adopted to overturn Chisholm v. Georgia,
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), in which a federal court held the state of Georgia liable to South
Carolina citizens for a debt. For a discussion of Chisholm, see Field, The Eleventh Amend-
ment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 515 (1977).
19. U.S. CONsT. amend. XI.
20. A state may be held to waive its eleventh amendment sovereign immunity if it does
so expressly. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974); Employees of the Dep't
of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 284-87 (1973). A
state's waiver of immunity in its own court does not imply an eleventh amendment waiver in
federal court. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Dep't of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 465 (1945).
Further, although Congress can abrogate the eleventh amendment shield to protect four-
teenth amendment interests, it must do so explicitly. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 343,
345 (1979). See generally Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to Create Causes of
Action Against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amend-
ments, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1460-64 (1975) (historical relationship of eleventh and
fourteenth amendments).
21. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) has been interpreted to hold that suits against a
state by its own citizens are barred by the eleventh amendment. See, eg., Monaco v. Missis-
sippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934). But see Pennhurst II, 104 S. CL at 921-22 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Justice Brennan has consistently argued that the eleventh amendment language,
"any suit... by citizens of another State" (emphasis added) should be given its plain mean-
ing, so that the eleventh amendment would not bar federal court suits against a state by its
own citizens. See generally Field, supra note 18, at 539-40 (analyzing Justice Brennan's posi-
tion); Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation,
83 COLUM. L. REv. 1889, 1892-94 (1983) ("Justice Brennan's interpretation of the amend-
ment is the only one consistent with its plain language, with the history of its adoption, and
with the earliest interpretations of its terms.").
22. Pennhurst II, 104 S. Ct. at 907-08.
23. For a general discussion of the protections federalism provides, see Kaden, Politics,
Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 847 (1979); Wechsler,
Political Safeguards of Federalism, in SELEcTED EssAYS ON CONSnTUtIONAL LAW 185-217
(1963).
24. See, eg., Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18, 26 (1933); Osborn v. United States Bank,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
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party in interest."25 Beyond these basic propositions, however,
what constitutes a claim against the state is unclear. It is often diffi-
cult to establish whether a suit in federal court is in substance a
"claim against the state."
26
The line of cases most relevant to Pennhurst II concerns when
or whether a suit in federal court against state officers is "against
the state." In other words, will the shield of the sovereign's eleventh
amendment immunity extend to protect the state officers from suit
in federal court?27 The leading decision on this question is Ex parte
Young.
2 8
Young was the attorney general of Minnesota.29 Railway stock-
holders fied suit in federal court to enjoin Young from enforcing
state-set rail freight rates alleged to be unconstitutional.3" After the
federal court had issued the requested injunction,3 1 Young violated
the injunction by attempting to enforce the rates.32 The circuit
court found him in contempt.33 Young argued in his defense that
the stockholders' suit was an action against the state, and therefore
the eleventh amendment shielded him from suit in federal court.' 4
The United States Supreme Court held that, despite the eleventh
amendment, the lower federal court had jurisdiction to try the case,
because a federal question was presented.35 Further, the Supreme
Court reasoned that because the statute was unconstitutional,36 the
state did not have the power to authorize Young's conduct;37 there-
fore, the officer was "stripped of his official or representative char-
acter and [was] subjected in his person to the consequences of his
individual conduct."'38
Many commentators believe that Ex parte Young is consistent
25. Ford Motor Co. v. Dep't of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945).
26. See infra notes 123-30, 160-72 and accompanying text.
27. See generally Davis, Suing the Government by Falsely Pretending to Sue an Officer,
29 U. CHI. L. REv. 435, 435-51 (1962) (advocating abolition of fiction that suit against state
officer is not suit against state).
28. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
29. Id at 126.
30. Id at 128-30.
31. Id at 132.
32. Id at 133-34.
33. I d at 134.
34. Id at 132, 134.
35. Id at 145.
36. Id at 148.
37. Id at 159.
38. Id at 160. Ex parte Young is often referred to as a "fiction" because "[olf course,
the Court well knew that the attorney general was still attorney general while he was enforc-
ing the statute, and the Court well knew that the effect of enjoining the attorney general was
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with the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity because im-
munity from suit was intended only to protect the sovereign itself
and not the officers of the sovereign.39 When the eleventh amend-
ment was adopted, the argument goes, it was well established at
common law in England that officers of the sovereign were subject
to suit.4 ' On the other hand, the Pennhurst II Court argued that
the Ex parte Young exception to the eleventh amendment is justifi-
able only if the supremacy of federal law is at issue.4' This theory
of exception to the eleventh amendment is premised on the facts of
Ex parte Young, 2 and on the theory that it attempted to balance
the state's eleventh amendment immunity and the federal govern-
ment's obligation to enforce the guarantees of the fourteenth
amendment.43
Despite the theoretical controversy, it is well settled that Ex
parte Young provides plaintiffs with federal court jurisdiction
against state officer defendants when federal questions are raised.'
Whatever the rationale, Ex parte Young is a mechanism for lower-
ing the shield of eleventh amendment immunity. Even after proper
federal jurisdiction has been established, a valid claim against state
officers may become an invalid claim against the state.45 The ques-
to enjoin the state from carrying out the unconstitutional statute." Davis, supra note 27, at
437.
39. See, e.g., Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers" Sovereign Immunity, 77
HARv. L. REv. 1, 1-2, 29 (1963).
40. See id. at 19-29; Gibbons, supra note 21, at 1895-99.
41. See Pennhurst I, 104 S. Ct. at 910-11.
42. Ex parte Young involved an unconstitutional statute. See supra notes 29-38.
43. Pennhurst 11, 104 S. Ct. at 910-11.
44. For cases where federal questions were raised by unconstitutional state statutes and
officers' actions, see Florida Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670 (1982)
(actions of state officer were held to be unconstitutional, even though state statute governing
his scope of authority was constitutional); Georgia 1KR. & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U.S.
299, 304 (1952) ('This Court has long held that a suit to restrain unconstitutional action
threatened by an individual who is a state officer is not a suit against the State."); Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. O'Connor, 223 U.S. 280, 287 (1912) (tax statute found unconstitu-
tional since state official "had no right... to collect the money, his doing so in the name of
the state cannot protect him"); Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College, 221 U.S. 636
(1911) (if an act is unconstitutional, it gives no authority to act and therefore does not confer
eleventh amendment immunity on state officers). Federal jurisdiction is also upheld when
questions are presented concerning federal statutes. See, e.g., Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
435 U.S. 151 (1978) (state statute void under supremacy clause because it conflicted with
federal statute; suit allowed against responsible state and local officials); Edelman v. Jordan,
415 U.S. 651 (1974) (conflict between federal and state regulations concerning federal benefit
program). These cases also suggest that the Ex parte Young fiction is not wholly dependent
upon fourteenth amendment violations to abrogate the eleventh amendment protective shield.
45. If, for instance, the court grants relief against the state rather than against the state
officer. See infra notes 160-76 and accompanying text.
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tion raised in Pennhurst 11 is whether the eleventh amendment de-
prives the federal court of jurisdiction when an otherwise valid
pendent state claim is asserted against state officers.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND OF PENNHURST I
Pennhurst State School and Hospital is a Pennsylvania state res-
idential institution for the mentally retarded.' The suit that
culminated in Pennhurst II was first filed in 1974 by a resident of
Pennhurst and was certified as a class action by the federal district
court in 1976.47 The plaintiff class consisted of past, present and
possible future residents of Pennhurst.48 The complaint alleged that
the conditions at Pennhurst violated various federal constitutional
rights49 and federal50 and state statutory"' provisions. Pennhurst,
various Pennhurst employees, state and county administrators and
officers, and the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare were
named as defendants.5 2
The District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
found the conditions at Pennhurst deplorable: the facilities were
overcrowded, understaffed and unsanitary.5" Patients were often
sedated, or kept in physical restraints or in seclusion rooms, primar-
ly because of an inadequate staff.54 Physical injuries and abuse
were common.55 The court also found that many residents lost
skills they had when they entered Pennhurst,5 6 and that they were
46. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1298 (E.D. Pa.
1977), affid in part, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979) (en banc), rev'd and remanded, 451 U.S. 1
(1981).
47. IaL at 1300.
48. Id. Other individual plaintiffs were allowed to intervene as were two groups repre-
senting the interests of the mentally retarded (Parents and Family Association of Pennhurst
and Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Citizens), as well as the United States. Id at
1301.
49. Specifically, the complaint alleged violations of the first, eighth, ninth, and four-
teenth amendments. Id at 1298 n.3.
50. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982); Developmentally Dis-
abled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, § 6010 (1975), 42 U.S.C. § 6010 (1982).
51. The Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act (MH/MR Act), PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 50, §§ 4101-4704 (Purdon 1969).
52. 446 F. Supp. at 1301-02.
53. Id at 1302-04.
54. Id at 1304-08.
55. Id at 1308-10.
56. Id at 1308. Although the question of whether a mentally retarded individual has a
protected interest in not having skills deteriorate during the period of confinement was not
reached by the district court, it is possible that such a right exists. In Youngberg v. Romeo,
457 U.S. 307 (1982), some Justices would have included "within the 'minimally adequate
training required by the Constitution' such training as is reasonably necessary to prevent a
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not receiving the training necessary for habilitation.57
The district court held that mentally retarded individuals in a
state residential institution had four distinct rights and that Penn-
hurst had violated each one. Pennhurst violated (1) its patients'
constitutional right under the due process clause to "minimally ade-
quate habilitation under the least restrictive conditions consistent
with the purpose of the commitment;""8 (2) their constitutional
right under the eighth and fourteenth amendments to be free from
harm;5 9 (3) their right to nondiscriminatory habilitation under the
equal protection clause' and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973;61 and (4) their state statutory right to minimally adequate
habilitation under the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Re-
tardation Act (MH/MR Act).62 The court set out a detailed reme-
dial order,63 to be administered by a special master, enjoining the
defendants from further constitutional and statutory violations and
ordering that Pennhurst eventually be closed and "suitable commu-
nity living arrangements" be established.
Sitting en banc, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals65 declined to
decide the constitutional issues, inasmuch as adequate statutory
grounds for decision existed.66 The appeals court decided the case
on a different federal statutory ground than did the district court,
holding that section 6010 of the Developmentally Disabled Assist-
person's preexisting self-care skills from deteriorating because of his commitment." Id at 327
(Blackmun, J., concurring). The Court in Youngberg held that involuntarily committed men-
tally retarded individuals had protected liberty interests in safety and freedom of movement
and that "minimally adequate training" was constitutionally required to secure these inter-
ests. Id at 320.
57. 446 F. Supp. at 1304-06. "'Habilitation' is the term of art used to refer to that
education, training and care required by retarded individuals to reach their maximum devel-
opment" Id at 1298. Although the trial court noted the technical difference between "ha-
bilitation" and "treatment," both the court of appeals and the Supreme Court used the words
interchangeably.
58. Id at 1319. Although Youngberg limited its holding to involuntarily committed
individuals, see supra note 57, the court in Pennhurst held that Penhurst's voluntarily com-
mitted individuals were similarly entitled to habilitation. 446 F. Supp. at 1310-11.
59. Id at 1320-21.
60. Id at 1321-22.
61. Id at 1323-24.
62. Id at 1322-23.
63. Id at 1326-29.
64. Id at 1326.
65. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979) (en
bane), rev'd and remanded, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
66. Id at 94. See generally Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 323 (1936) (discussing
principle of avoiding decision on constitutional issues when possible).
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ance and Bill of Rights Act67 creates a substantive right to treat-
ment or habilitation6 8 in "an environment that infringes least on the
personal liberties of the mentally retarded."69 The Pennsylvania
MH/MR Act was deemed an alternative ground for finding a right
to adequate habilitation.7' Though it substantially affirmed the trial
court's remedial order, the court of appeals ruled that Pennhurst
could not be ordered closed, 71 reasoning that for some individuals a
large institution was the least restrictive environment for minimally
adequate habilitation.72 Therefore, the court ordered that each resi-
dent's needs be assessed to determine appropriate placements.73
The Supreme Court, in Pennhurst I,7 held that section 6010 of
the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act
neither creates substantive rights for the mentally retarded nor im-
poses obligations on the states.75 Rather, it is a "mere federal-state
funding statute' 7 6 designed only to encourage states to provide bet-
ter services for the developmentally disabled.77 Suggesting that the
circuit court's state law determination may have been affected by an
incorrect reading of section 6010 and finding that there had been no
determination that the MH/MR Act required habilitation in the
"least restrictive environment,"7" the Court remanded the case. It
instructed the court below to determine whether the state law could
provide an adequate and independent state ground for the rem-
edy,7 9 or whether the federal constitutional or statutory claims
67. 42 U.S.C. § 6010 (1982).
68. 612 F.2d at 95-96.
69. Id. at 107.
70. Id. at 103.
71. Id. at 113-14. The court also rejected the argument that the eleventh amendment
was a bar with respect to the type of relief ordered, because this relief was prospective only.
Id at 109. For a discussion of the distinction between prospective and retrospective relief, see
infra notes 160-76 and accompanying text.
72. Id at 113-15. The court explicitly noted that the Constitution "does not preclude
resort to institutionalization" in the appropriate circumstances. Id at 115.
73. Id at 115-16.
74. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
75. Id at 18-27.
76. Id at 18.
77. Id at 20.
78. Id at 31.
79. Id The Court suggested that the appeals court "consider the state-law issues in
light of the Pennsylvania's Supreme Court's recent decision" in In re Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86,
429 A.2d 631 (1981). 451 U.S. at 31 n.24. See infra notes 81-84 and accompanying text for
the appellate court's interpretation of In re Schmidt, and infra notes 149-53 and accompany-
ing text for a discussion of how federalism values are protected by deciding cases on clearly
articulated state law grounds.
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could support the remedial order."0
The court of appeals, again sitting en banc, 1 held on remand
that the MH/MR Act provides a state law ground for its prior re-
medial order.8 2 All eight judges agreed that the state supreme
court's decision in In re Schmidt 83 supported the conclusion that
the MH/MR Act creates a right to minimally adequate habilitation
in the least restrictive environment.84 All eight judges agreed that
the eleventh amendment was not a bar to deciding the case on the
pendent state law claim. 5 However, four judges, in three separate
opinions, reasoned that the remedial order-particularly the part
that appointed a special master-was inappropriate.8 6
III. THE SuPREME CouRT's HOLDING
The United States Supreme Court, in Pennhurst 11,87 again re-
versed the court of appeals. The Court held that the Ex parte
Young exception 8 to the eleventh amendment was limited to cases
dealing with federal law questions.8 9 Reasoning that the only justi-
fication for abrogating eleventh amendment immunity was to pro-
tect competing fourteenth amendment values,90 the Court stated
that "[tihis need to reconcile competing interests is wholly absent,
however, when a plaintiff alleges that a state official has violated
80. 451 U.S. at 31.
81. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 673 F.2d 647 (3d Cir. 1982) (en
bane), rev'd and remanded, 104 S. Ct. 900 (1984).
82. Id at 656.
83. 494 Pa. 86, 429 A.2d 631 (1981).
84. 673 F.2d at 651-53; id at 662 (Seitz, CJ., dissenting in part); id at 663 (Garth, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting as to relief).
85. Id at 653-59; Id at 662 (Seitz, CJ., dissenting in part); id at 663 (Garth, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting as to relief).
86. I at 661-62 (Aldisert, J., concurring); id at 662 (Seitz, CJ., & Hunter, J., dissent-
ing in part); id at 662-71 (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting as to relief). Judge
Garth noted that the Supreme Court in Pennhurst I had particularly disapproved of the dis-
trict court's appointment of a special master as part of the remedial order. Id at 662. He
quoted extensively from Justice White's dissenting opinion and Justice Rehnquist's majority
opinion emphasizing the Supreme Court's "virtually unanimous" criticism of the appoint-
ment of a special master. Id at 665.
87. 104 S. Ct. 900 (1984).
88. See supra notes 28-45 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Exparte Young
exception to a state officer's eleventh amendment claim to sovereign immunity.
89. 104 S. Ct. at 911.
90. See id at 910-11 (" 'Exparte Young was the culmination of efforts by this Court to
harmonize the principles of the Eleventh Amendment with the effective supremacy of rights
and powers secured elsewhere in the Constitution.' ") (quoting Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82,
106 (1971) (Brennan, I., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
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state law."91 Since the suit was decided on a state law ground, the
Ex parte Young exception did not apply, and the claim became one
against the state, barred by the eleventh amendment.92 Instructing
state officials on how to conform their conduct to state law was
deemed intrusive and therefore destructive to the notion of federal-
ism underlying state sovereign immunity.93
Though acknowledging that Ex parte Young permitted prospec-
tive relief,94 the Court reasoned that merely because the plaintiffs
asked only for injunctive relief did not answer the question of
whether the Ex parte Young exception was operative." Rather, the
difference between prospective and retrospective relief was only im-
portant if Ex parte Young applied; and since it was inapplicable
when the basis of the claim was a state law violation, the fact that
the plaintiffs requested only injunctive relief did not reestablish fed-
eral court jurisdiction.96
The Court next addressed whether the doctrine of pendent juris-
diction, which normally allows federal courts to decide state law
questions once federal jurisdiction is properly obtained,9 7 "has a dif-
ferent scope when applied to suits against the State."98 Even
though federal jurisdiction had been established with the federal
constitutional and statutory claims in this case, the Court stated
that the eleventh amendment inquiry must be applied to each
claim.9 9 Reading Ex parte Young as a fiction to insure supremacy
of federal law, the Court concluded that the claim before it was "a
claim that state officials violated state law in carrying out their offi-
91. Id at 911.
92. Id
93. Id The Court later stated that "[in cases of ongoing oversight of a state program
that may extend over years, as in this case, the federal intrusion is likely to be extensive.
Duplication of effort, inconvenience, and uncertainty may well result." Id at 920 n.32. This
limitation on federal interference in state affairs represents a pervasive concern in recent
Supreme Court decisions. See, eg., Frug, The Judicial Power of the Purse, 126 U. PA. L.
REV. 715, 716 (1978) ('The Supreme Court has made clear that federalism limits federal
interference in state activity, and has required the judiciary to leave major policy questions to
the democratic decisionmaking process.").
94. 104 S. Ct. at 911.
95. Id
96. Id
97. See infra notes 137-46 and accompanying text for discussion of pendent jurisdiction.
98. 104 S. Ct. at 917. The Court held that this was a case of first impression, reasoning
that previous eleventh amendment cases involving state officers and pendent state law viola-
tions did not directly address the issue. Id at 917-18. See infra notes H0-31 and accompany-
ing text for a review of these cases.
99. 104 S. Ct. at 919.
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cial responsibilities. ' 'lc ° The eleventh amendment, therefore, barred
the claim. The Court stated further that its conclusion was not al-
tered by virtue of the claim having been asserted as a pendent state
claim.101
The majority devoted much of its opinion to answering the dis-
sent's arguments, rather than adequately addressing what it consid-
ered to be the relevant issues. The majority chided the dissent at
length for suggesting that the claim asserted was not against the
state. ' 2 The majority gave three reasons in support of its conclu-
sion that the suit was against the state of Pennsylvania: (I) the rem-
edy operated against the state because "in effect [the relief sought
and ordered] was that a major state institution be closed and
smaller state institutions be created and expansively funded;"10 3 (2)
the defendants had acted in good faith and, therefore, the relief was
"institutional" in character, making this a complaint against the
state for "not fulfilling its legislative promises;"'" and (3) the de-
fendants were vested with "broad discretion in operating Penn-
hurst," and were not acting outside of their authority.105
IV. CRITIQUE OF PENNHURST II
The majority misread the eleventh amendment and sovereign
immunity cases. The Ex parte Young exception is not merely pre-
mised on the vindication of federal law,'0 6 and even if this doctrine
were so limited, the Court's decision to abolish properly obtained
federal court jurisdiction misconstrues the meaning of federalism
and addresses the wrong concerns. Rather than focusing on
whether the purposes of Ex parte Young are satisfied when the suit
is decided on state law grounds, the inquiry should be whether the
100. I (emphasis added).
101. Id. The Court acknowledged that its conclusion might encourage claim splitting or
trying cases in state courts, but noted that this "is not uncommon in this area," ia at 920,
and that limiting the choice of forum is "inherent in our system of federalism." Id (quoting
Employees v. Missouri Pub. Health & Welfare Dep't, 411 U.S. 279, 298 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
concurring in the result)). The Court contended that allowing this type of claim to be de-
cided in federal court would not promote the policies that underlie the pendent jurisdiction
doctrine. Id at 920 n.32.
102. See infra notes 154-200 and accompanying text for a critique of this portion of the
Court's opinion.
103. 104 S. Ct. at 911.
104. Id at 912.
105. Id at 914. See infra notes 122-31 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
relevance of determining whether an officer is acting ultra vires.
106. See infra notes 110-31 and accompanying text; Pennhurst II, 104 S. Ct. at 933 (Ste-
vens, 3., dissenting).
1985]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
purposes of the eleventh amendment are furthered."°7
A. The Ex parte Young Doctrine
Commentators disagree as to how far the eleventh amendment
sovereign immunity protective shield is intended to extend.'08 Pre-
cedent supports the view that deciding a case on state law grounds
is permissible under the eleventh amendment and that the Ex parte
Young exception should be read to incorporate general notions of
the ultra vires doctrine.' 9 The analysis of whether the officer's ac-
tions should be considered those of the sovereign-in other words,
whether such actions are ultra vires-is not affected by whether the
claim is founded on a state or federal ground. If an officer has vio-
lated state law, "the suit is to get a state officer to do what a [state]
statute requires of him. The litigation is with the officer, not the
state."" Actions taken in violation of state law should not be con-
sidered actions of the sovereign.
The cases that most clearly support the theory that the eleventh
amendment is not a bar to deciding pendent state law claims are
Greene v. Louisville & Interurban Railroad (Greene),"' and its two
companion cases, Louisville & Nashville Railroad v. Greene"2 and
Illinois Central Railroad v. Greene." 3
In Greene, a railroad company sued officers of the state board of
valuation and assessment, the auditor of public accounts, and the
attorney general and his assistants." 4 The railroad requested in-
junctive relief from enforcement of certain "franchise taxes.""'  Ju-
risdiction was based on federal constitutional claims, and there was
a pendent state claim alleging violation of the state constitution.
107. See infra notes 149-53 and accompanying text.
108. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
109. In Pennhurst II, both the majority, 104 S. Ct at 914-16, and the dissent, id at 936-39
(Stevens, J., dissenting), rely on Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S.
682 (1949), to define when an officer's actions are ultra vires. See infra notes 126-31 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the Larson case.
110. Rolston v. Missouri Fund Comm'rs, 120 U.S. 390, 411 (1887) (emphasis added).
111. 244 U.S. 499 (1917). Inasmuch as Greene directly addresses the eleventh amend-
ment issues and the companion cases merely rely on its rationale, only Greene merits discus-
sion here.
112. 244 U.S. 522 (1917).
113. 244 U.S. 555 (1917). Another important pendent jurisdiction case, Siler v. Louis-
ville & Nashville R.R., 213 U.S. 175 (1909), also involved a suit against a state officer based
on state law. Siler did not discuss eleventh amendment issues, perhaps because the Court did
not think that the eleventh amendment could obstruct valid pendent jurisdiction. Thus, Siler
may have foreshadowed the explicit holding of Greene eight years later.
114. 244 U.S. 499, 502.
115. Id
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The Court stated that Ex parte Young held that injunctive relief
issued by a federal court against state officers to prevent the exercise
of state-authorized duties does not violate the eleventh amend-
ment.116 The Court further noted that Ex parte Young was not lim-
ited to cases involving violations of the federal constitution.1 17
Deciding the case on the state law ground,1 ' the Court reasoned
that state law claims against state officers were not beyond redress
in the federal courts." 9
The Pennhurst II Court argued that the Court in Greene did not
address the question of whether the eleventh amendment bars the
consideration of a pendent state claim. 120 However, the Greene
Court clearly went through a thoughtful eleventh amendment anal-
ysis to conclude that the Ex parte Young exception is not limited to
federal constitutional claims, even though the only other violations
alleged in Greene were due process and equal protection claims
under the United States Constitution.' 2 ' The Court impliedly sug-
gests in Pennhurst II that the Greene Court went through this intel-
lectual exercise for nothing, and that the Justices had not grasped
the true implications of the problem at hand. This argument is
unpersuasive.
When a state officer acts in violation of state law, the claim
against him should not be considered a claim against the state.
Johnson v. Lankford122 illustrates this point. In Lankford, a bank
commissioner was sued for failing to perform certain state statutory
duties and for violating federal constitutional rights. 2  The Court
dismissed the assertion that this was a claim against the state, not-
ing that
[t]o answer it otherwise would be to assert, we think, that
whatever an officer does, even in contravention of the laws of the
State, is state action, identifies him with it and makes the redress
sought against him a claim against the State and therefore pro-
hibited by the Eleventh Amendment. 124
By acting outside his authority, a state officer cannot be said to
be acting for the state. 25
116. Id. at 506-07.
117. Id. at 507.
118. Id at 508.
119. Id at 514.
120. 104 S. Ct. at 917-18.
121. 244 U.S. at 507.
122. 245 U.S. 541 (1918).
123. Id at 543.
124. Id at 545.
125. See also Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85, 91 (1982)("Mhe Eleventh Amendment bars
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This analysis is further supported by Larson v. Domestic & For-
eign Commerce Corp.126 Larson involved a federal officer, and ad-
dressed the question of whether the officer's actions were ultra vires
or whether they were rightfully attributable to the sovereign and
thus protected by sovereign immunity. Larson was the War Assets
Administrator.127 The plaintiff corporation requested injunctive re-
lief to prevent Larson from selling or delivering coal that the plain-
tiff claimed it owned pursuant to a contract.1 28 The Court stated
that suits involving officers acting outside their statutory authority
would not be considered suits against the sovereign:
[W]here the officer's powers are limited by statute, his actions
beyond those limitations are considered individual and not sover-
eign action. The officer is not doing the business which the sover-
eign has empowered him to do or he is doing it in a way which the
sovereign has forbidden. [Emphasis added.] His actions are ultra
vires his authority and therefore may be made the object of spe-
cific relief. It is important to note that in such cases the relief can
be granted, without impleading the sovereign, only because of the
officer's lack of delegated power. 129
The dissent in Larson also observed that "[r]ecovery has been sus-
tained where, although the official acts under a valid statute, he ac-
tually exceeded the authority with which the statute had invested
suits against state officers unless they are alleged to be acting contrary to federal law or
against the authority of state law." (Emphasis added)).
126. 337 U.S. 682 (1949).
127. Id at 684.
128. Id
129. Id at 689-90. The dissent in Pennhurst II correctly noted that this passage of Lar-
son establishes a two-track analysis that inquires into whether the officer's actions are author-
ized or whether they are forbidden. Pennhurst I, 104 S. Ct. at 937 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Commentators have criticized the Larson court's extension of immunity to officers. See eg.,
Davis, supra note 27, at 455-56; Shapiro, Comment: Wrong Turns: The Eleventh Amend-
ment and the Pennhurst Case, 98 HARv. L. REv. 61, 72-76 (1984).
Florida Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670 (1982), applies the Larson
rule that actions are ultra vires when the officer does "business which the sovereign has [not]
empowered him to do." In Treasure Salvors, artifacts from a 17th-century Spanish galleon
were discovered by Treasure Salvors, Inc. Id at 673. Florida claimed ownership under a
state statute governing "state-owned sovereignty submerged lands," and later entered into
contracts with Treasure Salvors. Id at 673-74. It was eventually determined, however, that
the United States owned the submerged property upon which the Spanish galleon was found,
therefore vitiating Florida's claim to the artifacts. Id at 675-76. The Court held that the
eleventh amendment was not a shield for state officers who were holding the property. Id at
692. The Court reasoned that "[t]his conclusion follows inevitably from Ex parte Young. If
conduct of a state officer taken pursuant to an unconstitutional state statute is deemed to be
unauthorized and may be challenged in federal court, conduct undertaken without any au-
thority whatever is also not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity." Id at 697 (emphasis
added).
[Vol. 35:481
FEDERALISM
him. - 13 0
In light of precedent, the theory of Ex parte Young may argua-
bly rest on the question of whether the actions complained of are
those of the sovereign. This approach is logical because state of-
ficers should not be protected by their sovereign's immunity if their
actions are unauthorized or forbidden. 131 Even if the majority in
Pennhurst II is correct in assuming that Ex parte Young is premised
upon the vindication of federal rights, it does not necessarily follow
that ultimately deciding a case on state law grounds should auto-
matically deprive a federal court of properly obtained pendent
jurisdiction.
B. The Court's Eleventh Amendment Exception to Exercising
Pendent Jurisdiction
The Court, after holding that the Ex parte Young exception to
eleventh amendment sovereign immunity does not apply when the
claim against a state officer is based on state law, addressed the in-
teraction between the eleventh amendment and the doctrine of pen-
dent jurisdiction.' 32 Acknowledging that state law claims generally
can be adjudicated in federal court once jurisdiction is estab-
lished,133 the majority then declared that "[t]he Court has not ad-
dressed whether that doctrine has a different scope when applied to
suits against the State."'134 In other words, the Court begins its
130. 337 U.S. at 716 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
131.
No doubt the [Court] that produced... Young would be shocked to discover that
conduct authorized by state law but prohibited by federal law is not considered
conduct attributable to the State for sovereign immunity purposes, but conduct pro-
hibited by state law is considered conduct attributable to the very State which pro-
hibited that conduct.
Pennhurst II, 104 S. Ct. at 934 (Stevens, I., dissenting).
132. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
133. 104 S. Ct at 917.
134. Id (emphasis added). See infra notes 155-200 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of how the Court broadly defines a "claim against the state." If taken literally, the Court
could be limiting pendent jurisdiction to purely private claims. Although counties and mu-
nicipalities are not protected by the eleventh amendment, Lincoln County v. Luning, 133
U.S. 529 (1890), the majority in Pennhurst II overturned the appeals court's judgment against
the defendant county officials as well. 104 S. Ct. at 920. The Court stated that it is not clear
whether a state law claim against county officials could be maintained in federal court, and
that "a suit against officials of a county or other governmental entity is barred if the relief
obtained runs against the State." Id. at 920-21 n.34 (emphasis added). For further criticism
of this result, see Shapiro, supra note 129, at 81-82. Shapiro argues that the Court in Penn-
hurst II may be rethinking the eleventh amendment protection for local governments: '"To
begin analyzing every lawsuit against a city or county or its officials to determine whether the
relief sought actually 'runs against the State' is to take one more step into the quicksand of
sovereign immunity doctrine." Id at 82.
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analysis presupposing that this was a claim against the state, not
state officers. Under this approach, the eleventh amendment shield
is already erected, and federal jurisdiction is eliminated. The Court
then asks whether the pendent jurisdiction doctrine can lower the
eleventh amendment shield in order to reestablish federal subject
matter jurisdiction. Such an analysis treats pendent state claims in
a procedurally backwards manner'35 and ignores the policies that
support both the pendent jurisdiction doctrine and the eleventh
amendment. 136
1. The Pendent Jurisdiction Doctrine
The operation of pendent jurisdiction is explained in Siler v.
Louisville & Nashville Railroad:37
[H]aving properly obtained [federal jurisdiction], that court ha[s]
the right to decide all the questions in the case, even though it
decide[s] the Federal questions adversely to the party raising
them, or even if it omit[s] to decide them at all, but decide[s] the
case on local or state questions only.138
Therefore, once a federal court has jurisdiction over the case, the
pendent state law claims may also be decided and may even provide
the sole basis for the decision.
United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs139 sets forth the pre-
requisites of pendent jurisdiction:
Pendent jurisdiction, in the sense of judicial power, exists when-
ever there is a claim "arising under [the] Constitution, the Laws
of the United States, and the Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority. . . " U.S. Const., Art. III, § 2,
and the relationship between that claim and the state claim per-
mits the conclusion that the entire action before the court com-
prises but one constitutional "case." The federal claim must
have substance sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction on
the court. . .. The state and federal claims must derive from a
common nucleus of operative fact. But if, considered without
regard to their federal or state character, a plaintiff's claims are
such that he would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one
judicial proceeding, then, assuming substantiality of the federal
issues, there is power in federal courts to hear the whole."4
135. See infra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
136. See infra notes 149-53 and accompanying text.
137. 213 U.S. 175 (1909).
138. Id at 191.
139. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
140. Id at 725 (emphasis in original).
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In order to exercise pendent jurisdiction, then, the critical question
is whether the state law claims are all part of the same case.
Pendent jurisdiction is a judicially created doctrine, and its 'jus-
tification lies in considerations of judicial economy, convenience
and fairness to litigants."'' It prevents parties from having to
bring multiple suits to try a case, or from being forced into state
courts to try federal claims. This doctrine also facilitates the judi-
cial rule that "[w]here a case. . . can be decided without reference
to questions arising under the Federal Constitution, that course is
usually pursued."' 42 Pendent jurisdiction therefore aids in prevent-
ing the unnecessary adjudication of constitutional questions.
Lee v. Bickell,4 a moreover, illustrates that deciding cases on
state statutory grounds can do more than merely avoid deciding
constitutional issues-it also provides the state courts or legislatures
the opportunity to alter or even disregard the federal court's hold-
ing.144 This promotes federalism in two very important ways: it
recognizes the policy-making role of the states14  and it allows
states to retain some control over the outcome of federally decided
cases. 146
2. Pendent Jurisdiction in Pennhurst II
By presuming that Pennhurst // was a claim against the state
when it examined the issue of pendent jurisdiction, the Court re-
versed the procedural order in which pendent jurisdiction operates.
The plaintiffs in the Pennhurst cases had established proper federal
jurisdiction by virtue of having raised adequate federal constitu-
tional and statutory claims against state officers, which are within
the exception of the Ex parte Young case. Once federal jurisdiction
is established, state claims may be appended if they are derived
141. Id. at 726.
142. Siler, 213 U.S. at 193.
143. 292 U.S. 415 (1934).
144. In Lee, the plaintiff alleged that certain state tax levies were unconstitutional and
that the state statute had been violated. Id at 417. Holding that the statute did not permit
the contested taxation, the Court did not need to reach the constitutional claims. Id at 425.
The Court noted that if the state court later determined that the statute allowed these taxes,
the constitutionality of the statute could then be examined. Id
145. See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 775-97 (1982) (O'Connor, ., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (stating that it is against the principles of federalism to make
states accountable to the federal government for basic policy decisions); Kaden, supra note
23, at 849-57.
146. See Pennhurst II, 104 S. Ct. at 941-42 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also infra note
153 and accompanying text for a discussion of the varying degrees of permanency that differ-
ent types of court decisions have.
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"from a common nucleus of operative fact."147 No one contends
that the plaintiffs lacked federal subject matter jurisdiction 14  or
that the lower federal courts incorrectly appended the state law
claim. With proper jurisdiction, the eleventh amendment shield
had been lowered properly by virtue of the Ex parte Young excep-
tion. This consideration operates before a court determines upon
which grounds the case will be decided.
Therefore, when addressing what effect exercising pendent juris-
diction will have on sovereign immunity, the appropriate inquiry is
whether the eleventh amendment shield must be erected-not, as
the majority suggests, whether the eleventh amendment shield must
be lowered. By virtue of the Exparte Young exception, before exer-
cising pendent jurisdiction the suit simply is not a suit against the
state. When the question of whether to decide the case on a pen-
dent ground is addressed by a court, the officers are assumed to be
the proper defendants, unprotected by their sovereign's immunity
under the eleventh amendment.
The proper question, therefore, is whether the eleventh amend-
ment shield must be reactivated when the case is decided on a pen-
dent state law ground. The majority suggests that this question is
answered by focusing on whether the justification for the Ex parte
Young exception continues to be in force.'49 Because deciding a
case on state law grounds does not uphold the supremacy of federal
law, the majority would argue that the eleventh amendment shield
comes into effect, and that the state thus becomes the party
defendant.
147. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). In Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), the Court held that pendent jurisdiction had been properly
exercised with respect to a state statutory claim, even though this was an eleventh amend-
ment case. Id at 653. Although the Court held that retroactive relief could not be granted
on the basis of the pendent state law claim, id at 678, its holding focused on the nature of
retroactive relief, not pendent jurisdiction. See infra notes 160-76 and accompanying text for
further discussion of prospective versus retroactive remedies.
148. The district court's holding that the conditions at Pennhurst violated constitution-
ally protected rights supports the position that the plaintiffs presented a "real and substantial
question under the Constitution of the United States." Davis v. Wallace, 257 U.S. 478, 482
(1922). See also Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1312 (5th Cir. 1974) ("[Clivilly commit-
ted mental patients have a constitutional right to such individual treatment as will help each
of them to be cured or to improve his or her mental condition.").
149. By doing this, the Court rejects the longstanding doctrine of pendent jurisdiction,
presumably because of its interpretation of federalism concerns. One commentator suggests
that the Supreme Court's federalism concern centered on whether "a branch of the federal
government is directing the allocation of state funds." Frug, supra note 93, at 734. However,
this would seem irrelevant if the federal court were implementing state rather than federal
policy.
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The proper inquiry, however, should focus on how exercising
pendent jurisdiction will affect the principles of federalism that un-
derlie the eleventh amendment. Specifically, the ultimate issue is
whether deciding the case on state law grounds will damage, pro-
mote, or not affect the federalism values underlying the state's con-
stitutional right to sovereign immunity. If deciding the case on
pendent state law grounds does not do violence to federalism, but in
fact promotes federalism values by recognizing states as valid pol-
icy-making bodies, there is no reason to raise the eleventh amend-
ment shield once again. After all, it is the policy underlying the
eleventh amendment, rather than the policy underlying the excep-
tion to the amendment, that should be the courts' concern.
To have the Pennhurst II decision rest on state law grounds
would respect and promote the federalism values underlying the
eleventh amendment. The state of Pennsylvania through its legisla-
ture50 and its highest state court15' had announced a particular
policy regarding the mentally retarded. Pennhurst II was not a suit
against the state, but rather a suit to enforce a policy promulgated
by the state. The federal courts, in deciding the case on state law
grounds, were recognizing and implementing state policy and ap-
plying state law against officers alleged to be acting in violation of
state law. Pennhurst ii is therefore not a case that involved unnec-
essary determinations of state law questions.152
Deciding the state law issues presented would also promote fed-
eralism because of the less permanent effect that such a course has
on the state. The Pennsylvania legislature could change its laws, or
its courts could determine that the law had been misapplied. In this
way, the state retains power over policy making. In contrast, when
a federal court is forced to decide a case on constitutional grounds,
the effects are permanent, until overturned, because the decision im-
poses obligations on the state to uphold constitutional rights." 3 In
150. The legislature established state policy by enacting the MH/MR Act, and by allo-
cating money to fund community facilities for the mentally retarded. See infra note 172
(discussing allocations).
151. In re Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86, 429 A.2d 631 (1981).
152. The majority in Pennhurst II stated that the federal court's remedy was "based on
inferences drawn from dicta in a state court opinion," 104 S. Ct. at 920 n.32 (emphasis added),
even though all eight appellate court judges agreed on the interpretation of In re Schmidt.
See supra note 84 and accompanying text. If the state law issue truly were unclear, it would
more properly be dealt with under the Pullman abstention doctrine. Under this doctrine
federal courts may decline to decide state law issues involving statutes that have not been
interpreted by the state court. See Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 499-500
(1941).
153. See, e.g., Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 571 (1947) (cited by the
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short, a decision on federal constitutional grounds limits the options
available to a state to implement its chosen policies.
C. Dicta of the Court: When is a Claim "'Against the State"?
Part III-B of the majority's opinion in Pennhurst 1154 is the
most confusing and distressing aspect of this case. It is difficult to
distinguish the Court's holding from its dicta. The Court further
complicated its task by misapplying settled doctrine in an attempt
to counter the dissent's arguments, although the lengthy discussion
is irrelevant to the majority's holding.
After concluding that the Ex parte Young exception is "inappli-
cable in a suit against state officials on the basis of state law," '155 the
majority states in part III-B that "[t]he contrary view of Justice
Stevens' dissent rests on fiction, is wrong on the law, and, most im-
portant, would emasculate the Eleventh Amendment."1 6 In a foot-
note, the majority explained that it was "prompted to respond" to
the dissent's reading of a number of eleventh amendment cases."57
This section should first be recognized for what it is: a response to
the dissent. Moreover, it should properly be considered dicta. Be-
cause the majority argued that Ex parte Young is inapplicable, and
because they viewed it as the only available exception to sovereignimmunity, the federal courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction to
decide the issues presented in this case. This is the essence of their
holding, and therefore, the question of whether relief ran against the
state is irrelevant because the court could not grant a remedy with-
out having jurisdiction.
1. Relief Operating Against the State
The majority argued that the relief in Pennhurst I operated
against the state, and therefore, was barred by the eleventh amend-
ment. This discussion is not only irrelevant to the Court's hold-
ing,"58 it also contradicts the majority's position in the previous
dissent in Pennhurst II, 104 S. Ct. at 941-42, in support of its argument against unnecessarily
deciding federal constitutional issues).
154. 104 S. Ct. at 911-17.
155. Id. at 911.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 911 n.14.
158. Cases such as Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), illustrate that a valid claim
against state officers can become an invalid claim against the state if the remedy ordered will
affect the state treasury. However, if a suit against state officers based on state law cannot be
entertained by federal courts at all, then the remedy has no significance because the court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case. The question of the appropriateness of the
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section of the case. The majority had already reasoned that the type
of relief sought was only an appropriate question when Ex parte
Young was applicable.'59 To then argue that the relief sought ran
against the state is nothing more than doubletalk. The issue of re-
lief either matters or does not.
There are also substantive problems with the Court's dicta. The
suggestion that the relief here was "relief against the state" blurs the
distinction between prospective and retrospective relief.16° In previ-
ous eleventh amendment cases, the Court has consistently inquired
whether the relief sought would affect the state treasury. However,
no decision has gone so far as to state that any impact on the state
funds would convert a legitimate suit against state officials into a
suit against the state. Instead, the Court has consistently inquired
whether the relief is essentially the equivalent of monetary damages,
and it has upheld costly prospective relief that has been incident to
satisfying an equitable claim.
In Edelman v. Jordan,6' for instance, the Court held that retro-
active payments could not be ordered because such a ruling would
be tantamount to requiring the payment of money out of the state
treasury. 162 In Quern v. Jordan,163 the Court articulated the dis-
tinction between Ex parte Young and Edelman:
[W]e also pointed out that under the landmark decision in Ex
parte Young..., a federal court, consistent with the Eleventh
Amendment, may enjoin state officials to conform their future
conduct to the requirements of federal law, even though such an
injunction may have an ancillary effect on the state treasury
.... The distinction between that relief permissible under the
doctrine of Ex parte Young and that found barred in Edelman
was the difference between prospective relief on one hand and
retrospective relief on the other. 164
Hutto v. Finney16 stressed this aspect of Edelman:
The distinction [between retrospective and prospective reliefl
did not immunize the states from their obligation to obey costly
federal-court orders. The cost of compliance is 'ancillary' to the
prospective order enforcing federal law.... The line between
remedy therefore should only be raised once proper jurisdiction over the parties and claims
has been established.
159. Pennhurst II, 104 S. Ct. at 910-11.
160. This distinction had already been blurred to some extent in Cory v. White, 457 U.S.
85 (1982).
161. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
162. Id at 664-65.
163. 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
164. IdL at 337.
165. 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
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retroactive and prospective relief cannot be so rigid that it defeats
the effective enforcement of prospective relief.
166
In Hutto, the Court went so far as to uphold the lower court's order
that attorney's fees be paid from public funds. 67
Moreover, the Pennhurst I1 Court's conclusion does not make
clear whether it is the relief sought or the remedy granted which
runs against the state. The majority noted that the "relief sought
and ordered here.. .was that a major state institution be
closed,"' 168 even though the appellate court specifically held that or-
dering Pennhurst to close could not be supported. 169 If Pennhurst
I1 means that deciding whether a suit is against the state should be
governed by the plaintiff's complaint-the relief sought, as opposed
to the relief granted-then the federal court would have lacked ju-
risdiction from the day the lawsuit was filed. 17° In Edelman, how-
ever, part of the relief sought was denied by the Supreme Court
because it was retroactive in nature and directed against the state.''
The entire case in Edelman was not dismissed for lack of jurisdic-
tion; the Court merely overturned the retroactive remedy in order
to meet the eleventh amendment requirements. Therefore, if Penn-
hurst II is read to suggest that the type of relief sought transforms a
legitimate claim against state officers into a suit against the state,
then Edelman and other eleventh amendment cases are implicitly
overruled. 72
166. Id. at 690.
167. Id. at 691-92. This suit was against prison officials who were found to have acted in
bad faith. The Court noted that in some instances fines will be a less intrusive remedy:
If a state agency refuses to adhere to a court order, a financial penalty may be
the most effective means of insuring compliance. The principles of federalism that
inform Eleventh Amendment doctrine surely do not require federal courts to en-
force their decrees only by sending high state officials to jail. The less intrusive
power to impose a fine is properly treated as ancillary to the federal court's power to
impose injunctive relief.
Id. at 691.
168. 104 S. Ct. at 911.
169. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
170. The plaintiffs sought to close Pennhurst, to erect community facilities, and to obtain
adequate habilitation and money damages. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp.,
446 F. Supp. at 1298. Not all of these remedies were granted.
171. See supra notes 158, 161-62 and accompanying text.
172. Further, a review of the case history reveals that the Court erroneously stated that
Pennhurst was ordered to be closed. The court of appeals twice said this was not part of the
remedy. 612 F.2d at 113-14; 673 F.2d at 660. Though the Supreme Court stated that estab-
lishing community living facilities would be very costly to Pennsylvania, 104 S. Ct. at 911, the
district court's findings suggest that this would be less costly than operating large institutions.
446 F. Supp. at 1312. It cost approximately $63 per resident per day at Pennhurst, while at
most $17.64 per resident per day in less restrictive environments. Further, the Pennsylvania
legislature had already allocated $21 million for implementing plans to place the mentally
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If the problem concerns the remedy granted, it is more appropri-
ate to modify the remedy, as was done in Edelman, than to deny
federal court jurisdiction altogether. 7 The majority strongly sug-
gested that the remedy granted was overly intrusive, and therefore,
damaging to federalism values.174 However, lessening the intrusive-
ness of the remedy can be accomplished by changing the remedy
itself. 17 Eliminating federal jurisdiction results in potential harm
to the litigants, 176 the state, and federalism values.
2. Good Faith
In considering whether the relief in Pennhurst 11 ran against the
state, the majority embarked on a discussion of the defendants'
good faith.' 77 The court noted that the defendants were found by
the lower court to be acting in good faith and "apparently took
every means available to them to reduce the incidents of abuse and
injury, but were constantly faced with staff shortages.' 7 8 The ma-
jority stated that these findings supported its conclusion that the
"relief ordered by the courts below was institutional and official in
character. To the extent there was a violation of state law in this
case, it is a case of a State itself not fulfilling its legislative
promises." 179  In a footnote, the Court then acknowledged that
good faith is only relevant to the issue of immunity from damages
retarded in less restrictive environments. By the time the district court decided the case,
seven years after the allocation, $18 million had yet to be spent. Id
173. " he difficulty with relying on the eleventh amendment to bar direct federal court
mandates on the state treasury is that eleventh amendment prohibitions are absolute, denying
federal power to provide the remedy under any circumstances." Frug, supra note 93, at 755.
174. 104 S. Ct. at 911-12, 920 n.32.
175. Cf Durchslag, Federalism and Constitutional Liberties Varying the Remedy to
Save the Right, 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 723 (1979) (discussing remedy options that protect feder-
alism in § 1983 suits, school desegregation suits, and procedural due process claims, among
others).
176. Although the majority states that claim splitting is common in the eleventh amend-
ment context, 104 S. Ct. at 919-20, the pendent jurisdiction doctrine was created to address
the inherent unfairness and inconvenience that results from having to try a case in more than
one forum. See supra notes 138-42 and accompanying text.
177. 104 S. Ct. at 912.
178. Id This finding of good faith appears on its face to relate only to the defendants at
Pennhurst Hospital itself, and probably not to higher level state officials.
179. 104 S. Ct. at 912. State legislatures ultimately will bear the burden of correcting the
violations complained of in many eleventh amendment cases. It is interesting that the
Supreme Court intimates that Pennsylvania was not fulfilling its legislative promises, rather
than realizing that perhaps responsible state officials were not spending the money appropri-
ated. The problem of state officials not spending money already allocated is not uncommon.
See, ag., Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283, 288 (5th Cir. 1977) (after noting that funds for
a new prison had been approved, the court "expresse[d] the hope that the difficulties encoun-
tered in naming a location for the new prison [would] be speedily resolved").
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when a court has proper jurisdiction, but "[t]he point is that the
courts below did not have jurisdiction because the relief ordered so
plainly ran against the State."18
It is no wonder that "[tihe dissent appears to be confused about
[the majority's] argument here." '181 The Court ignores its own
holding that because Exparte Young is inapplicable in this case, the
lower courts lacked jurisdiction. The holding that Ex parte Young
is inapplicable has nothing to do with the type of relief ordered.
Further, the Court's whole argument is circular: good faith is rec-
ognized as a defense available to state officers against damages. But
in the Pennhurst 11 dicta, the Court asserts without explanation that
good faith is an indicator of whether relief runs against the state,
which can then deprive a federal court of jurisdiction.
Good faith has never before been regarded as a factor that pro-
vides state officials with absolute eleventh amendment protection.
Edelman v. Jordan82 illustrates this point. The defendants in that
case were officials who were acting pursuant to state regulations for
distributing federal assistance funds. Although their actions vio-
lated federal law, the officers were not only acting in good faith by
following the invalid regulations, but they could not have acted
otherwise under state law. The officers' good faith did not, how-
ever, provide them with eleventh amendment immunity. Rather,
the effect of the Edelman case was to instruct a state legislature to
repeal invalid regulations by enjoining state officers. That order
would certainly qualify as "institutional" relief, as the Pennhurst II
Court describes it, yet the Edelman Court held it to be appropriate
under the eleventh amendment.1
83
The Court's reasoning suggests that the legislature is responsible
180. 104 S. Ct. at 912 n.17.
181. Id.
182. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
183. Id. at 651. Eighth amendment prison cases stand for the proposition that lack of
funding is not an excuse for violating substantive rights, even if the defendant state officers
acted in good faith. In Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 385 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aftid, 442
F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971), the district court stated, "Let there be no mistake in the matter, the
obligation of the Respondents to eliminate existing unconstitutionalities does not depend
upon what the Legislature may do, or upon what the Governor may do, or, indeed, upon
what Respondents may actually be able to accomplish." Nor should good faith provide
prison officials with an eleventh amendment defense. If that were the case, unconstitutional
conditions might never be eradicated. This reasoning should not be limited to constitutional
violations because federalism dictates that federal courts should acknowledge state-created
substantive rights. Cf. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) (lack of funding does not
excuse failure to meet constitutionally mandated school desegregation objectives); Wyatt v.
Alderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1314-15 (5th Cir. 1974) (state institutions for the mentally ill and
mentally retarded).
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for making every decision that affects the rights of the mentally re-
tarded. Although the legislature had passed a law and had allo-
cated money for smaller community facilities, it is not clear which
Pennsylvania official was to be in charge of spending this money.
Certainly, the legislature does not specify all of the arrangements
for establishing community living facilities."' Lack of funding was
probably not the only reason for staff shortages; when paid staff left
Pennhurst, the vacancies were rarely filled.' 8 5 It is conceivable that
with expected employee attrition, those state officers responsible for
replacing staff either were unable to attract qualified staff to work in
such deplorable conditions, or chose to use staff funds in alternative
areas.
These factual disputes aside, however, the danger inherent in the
majority's analysis is clear: good faith should neither be the mea-
sure for whether state officers are acting within their statutory au-
thority nor serve to immunize them from injunctive relief."8 6
3. Discretion
The final disconcerting aspect of part III-B of the majority's
opinion is the Court's discussion of whether the defendants were, in
fact, acting within their statutory authority.' 87 Although this anal-
ysis is essential to the dissent's theory,' it is irrelevant to the ma-
jority's holding. The majority held that Exparte Young is premised
on the theory of vindicating federal rights; 8 9 thus, the Court cannot
184. As the court inIn re Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86, 429 A.2d 631 (1981) explained, the coun-
ties have a great deal of responsibility under the MH/MR Act for providing the mentally
retarded with residential facilities. See Pennhurst, 673 F.2d 647, 652-56.
185. 446 F. Supp. at 1303. This theory is applicable only if it is assumed that money is
allocated for the particular position that a staff person fills before he or she decides to leave
Pennhurst.
186. Good faith has been held to be relevant in determining whether certain state officials
will be immune from money damages in § 1983 claims. See, eg., Wood v. Strickland, 420
U.S. 308 (1975) (school board officials); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (state execu-
tive officers). In Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982), the Court addressed both the
issue of good faith immunity for state mental retardation hospital officials and the issue of
inadequate funding to make changes, saying: "In an action for damages against a profes-
sional in his individual capacity, however, the professional will not be liable if he was unable
to satisfy his normal professional standards because of budgetary constraints; in such a situa-
tion, good-faith immunity would bar liability." Id at 323. Even if there were a budget defti-
ciency problem in Pennhurst II, therefore, good faith should only be relevant to whether
money damages will be awarded-not to whether the eleventh amendment bars the suit.
187. 104 S. Ct. at 912-14.
188. The dissent correctly argues that Exparte Young incorporates the notion that "con-
duct that exceeds the scope of an official's lawful discretion is not conduct the sovereign has
authorized and hence is subject to injunction." 104 S. CL at 929 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
189. See supra notes 88-93.
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also consistently argue that the ultra vires cases are part of the Ex
parte Young doctrine. In other words, the issue of whether an indi-
vidual officer was acting pursuant to his authority does not answer
the question of whether a federal court has proper jurisdiction to
decide the case. If the case is to be decided on a state law ground,
the Court reasons that the Exparte Young exception is inapplicable,
and the eleventh amendment destroys the court's jurisdiction. It
becomes irrelevant whether the officers were actually acting within
their authority.1 90
The majority states, however, that the state officers were not act-
ing ultra vires to their statutory authority because they had broad
discretion to make operational decisions. 191 The principal difficulty
with the Court's conclusion is that it blurs the distinction between
legislative means and ends. Although officers may in fact have
broad discretion in selecting the means to implement state policy, 192
they will always have less discretion with respect to the ends. 3
Having some discretion does not necessarily answer the question of
whether an officer is acting beyond his authority because this discre-
tion is only relevant with respect to the means used. Nor does hav-
ing discretion with respect to means automatically exclude an
officer from being challenged in court, because discretion can al-
ways be subject to a claim of abuse.194 If an officer "has no power
at all to do the act complained of,"'195 he can be enjoined; if the
actions are within the officer's discretion, he cannot be.196
The "acts" complained of in Pennhurst II were the living condi-
190. If the court has jurisdiction to decide the case, then the court may reach the issue of
whether the officer exceeded his scope of authority.
191. 104 S. Ct. at 914.
192. For example, the Pennhurst defendants had "broad discretion to provide 'adequate'
mental health services." Ida at 909 n.l. Although courts may defer to professional judg-
ment on the manner in which "adequate" service can best be provided, "[t]he essence of
respondents' claim is that petitioners have not provided such services adequately." Id The
inadequacy of the service relates to what the legislative goal was for Pennhurst. See infra
notes 198-99 and accompanying text for a discussion of the legislative plan set out in the
MH/MR Act.
193. Establishing state policy is a legislative function, and to delegate that power to the
executive or judicial branch would damage the democratic decisionmaking process. Frug,
supra note 93, at 734.
194. See, eg., Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605, 620 (1912) (suit against federal
officer was not against the sovereign since it rested "upon the charge of abuse of power").
195. Noble v. Union River Logging R.R., 147 U.S. 165, 172 (1893).
196. Id. at 171. Similarly, this is not a case like Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975),
where the Court determined that the school board had discretionary powers to act promptly.
The issue in Wood concerned immunity from monetary damages, not injunctive relief. The
Pennhurst case involves a fact situation illustrating years of harm inflicted upon helpless men-
tally retarded residents. Discretion to prolong these conditions does not warrant protection.
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tions that existed at the Pennhurst institution for the mentally re-
tarded-filth, overcrowding, abusive patient treatment, restraint
and drugging of patients, and the lack of adequate staff and training
necessary for the habilitation of the mentally retarded. 197 The con-
ditions at Pennhurst were deplorable. Nor was it within the discre-
tion of any of the state officers to house the mentally retarded in
such an environment. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court had inter-
preted the Pennsylvania legislature's goal in enacting the MH/MR
Act to be the minimally adequate habilitation of the mentally re-
tarded in the least restrictive environment."9 The legislative design
was not being implemented by the responsible state officials. To
interpret the failure of these officers to maintain minimal conditions
as a legitimate exercise of their discretion would be to suggest that
the officers themselves were empowered to establish the state legis-
lative policy. 199
The United States Supreme Court, therefore, has paid little re-
spect to the Pennsylvania court's statement of its own law. Rather
than promoting federalism values, as the Court professes to do, it
has created more friction between state and federal courts than ap-
plying the clearly articulated state policy would have done.20°
The majority uses a broad brush in part III-B of its opinion in
finding a claim against the state. This section must be recognized as
dicta because it is unnecessary to the Court's holding that the elev-
enth amendment shield will protect state officers when a decision is
based on a state law claim. Moreover, the Court's reasoning runs
contrary to the established case law regarding how the type of relief
granted might affect eleventh amendment protection; the role of a
197. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text. These conditions were also inconsis-
tent with the concept of housing the mentally retarded in the least restrictive environment.
See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
198. In re Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86, 96-98, 429 A.2d 631, 636-37 (1981). Cf Burt, Constitu-
tionalLaw and the Teaching of Parables, 93 YALE LJ. 455,491-96 (1984) (constitutional and
statutory rights to habilitation must be recognized).
199. Although the majority in Pennhurst 11 stated that this interpretation of the
MH/MR Act was merely dicta of the Pennsylvania court, 104 S. Ct at 920 n.32, the state
court's statement "cannot be read as other than an official interpretation of the Common-
wealth's statutory scheme." Pennhurst, 673 F.2d at 667 n.7 (Garth, J., concurring in part
and dissenting as to relief).
200. If the majority is suggesting that Pennsylvania law in fact permitted these conditions
to exist at Pennhurst, then it is not only second guessing the state supreme court and lower
federal courts' interpretation of the MH/MR Act, but it is leaving open the possibility that
the MH/MR Act could be found unconstitutional for allowing these conditions to exist. See
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316-19 (1982) ("minimally adequate or reasonable train-
ing" constitutionally required to secure protected liberty interests in safety and freedom of
movement).
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defendant's good faith in determining the issue of immunity from
damages and injunctive relief; and how sovereign immunity, the is-
sue of discretion, and the concept of ultra vires actions interrelate.
V. CONCLUSION
The Pennhurst H holding should be read as narrowly as possi-
ble. It should stand for the limited proposition that the Ex parte
Young exception to eleventh amendment sovereign immunity will
not apply to cases that grant relief on the basis of a pendent state
law claim. The other aspects of the Court's opinion should be con-
sidered dicta and be accorded little weight.
The Court intimated that it was displeased with the intrusive-
ness of the lower court's remedial order. In light of other Supreme
Court cases, it appears that the Court's concern for federalism will
continue to cloud its reasoning.20 1 Federalism interests can be pro-
tected by focusing on the appropriateness of the remedial order, and
when necessary, by modifying it. This approach would have prop-
erly respected Pennsylvania's legislative goals, while sustaining the
policies underlying pendent jurisdiction and the principles of feder-
alism that inform the eleventh amendment.
ANN N. BUTENHOF
201. One commentator has noted the trend of the Burger Court to limit substantive rights
in the name of federalism. See Durchslag, supra note 175, at 737-42. But cf Frug, supra
note 93, at 716, 733-34 ("IT]here must be some limit to federal judicial power to commandeer
affirmative legislative and executive power even to enforce its decision defining constitutional
rights.").
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